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Abstract—Security is one of the fundamental challenges in the
Internet of Things (IoT) due to the heterogeneity and resource
constraints of the IoT devices. Device classification methods are
employed to enhance the security of IoT by detecting unregistered
devices or traffic patterns. In recent years, blockchain has
received tremendous attention as a distributed trustless platform
to enhance the security of IoT. Conventional device identification
methods are not directly applicable in blockchain-based IoT as
network layer packets are not stored in the blockchain. Moreover,
the transactions are broadcast and thus have no destination IP
address and contain a public key as the user identity, and are
stored permanently in blockchain which can be read by any
entity in the network. We show that device identification in
blockchain introduces privacy risks as the malicious nodes can
identify users’ activity pattern by analyzing the temporal pattern
of their transactions in the blockchain. We study the likelihood
of classifying IoT devices by analyzing their information stored
in the blockchain, which to the best of our knowledge, is the
first work of its kind. We use a smart home as a representative
IoT scenario. First, a blockchain is populated according to a
real-world smart home traffic dataset. We then apply machine
learning algorithms on the data stored in the blockchain to
analyze the success rate of device classification, modeling both an
informed and a blind attacker. Our results demonstrate success
rates over 90% in classifying devices. We propose three times-
tamp obfuscation methods, namely combining multiple packets
into a single transaction, merging ledgers of multiple devices,
and randomly delaying transactions, to reduce the success rate in
classifying devices. The proposed timestamp obfuscation methods
can reduce the classification success rates to as low as 20%.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Blockchain, Anonymity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) brings connectivity to everyday
devices and enables a wide range of personalized services to
end users. There have been many attacks reported on the IoT
devices in recent years [1], [2]. Conventional security solutions
are too heavy weight for IoT and thus significant research has
focused on improving IoT security [3]
1) Overview: Due to the ever increasing number of IoT
devices, it is of great importance for the operators of the smart
environments, e.g., a smart campus, to determine the type of
devices connected to their site and ascertain that the devices
are functioning normally. Device classification methods are
employed to address the aforementioned challenge. The au-
thors in [4] analyzed the real-time traffic of IoT devices, which
includes network layer packets, e.g., SMTP, to identify the
semantic type of the device (e.g., a camera, a motion sensor,
or a smart light). In [5], the authors employed software defined
The first two authors contributed equally to this work.
networking to identify the devices that lack proper security
configurations. The authors in [6] employed machine learning
algorithms for device classification.
Blockchain has attracted tremendous attention as a promis-
ing approach to mitigate security risks in IoT due to its
salient features which includes transparency, immutability, and
decentralization. All transactions, i.e., communications be-
tween devices, are stored permanently in the blockchain. Each
block includes the hash of its previous block in the ledger,
which ensures immutability of the ledger. The modification or
removal of the block content, i.e., transactions, is impossible,
since the hash maintained in the subsequent block will not
match with the hash of the modified block.
The transactions are cryptographically sealed using pub-
lic/private keys. The Public Key (PK) used in each transaction
is employed as the identity of the transaction generator. This
introduces a level of anonymity for the blockchain users as
their real identity remains unknown to the participating nodes.
To enhance their anonymity, the users may change their PK
for each new transaction as in Bitcoin [7]. This protects users
against linking attacks, where malicious nodes attempt to
deanonymize a user by tracking multiple identities of the user.
2) Challenges: Unlike conventional device identification
methods where the main aim is to detect malicious devices, in
blockchain-based IoT, device classification is a privacy risk,
where the goal is to expose the user’s activity patterns based
on the sensed data. An attacker with the intention of unveiling
a user’s activities must first determine the type of sensing
devices in the user’s premises. The combination of user
deanonymisation and device identification can therefore be a
powerful tool for an attacker to determine a user’s identity and
activities. For example, in energy trading, the malicious nodes
can identify the energy consumption pattern of the users, or in
a smart city, the malicious node can link multiple transactions
to track the historical record of the location of a particular
vehicle. Conceptually, device classification in blockchain is
similar to the linking attack [8] where the attacker attempts to
link multiple anonymous transactions to a particular user (see
Section II).
The use of blockchain for recording IoT device transactions
changes the design space for device classification due to the
following reasons:
i) Transactions are permanently stored in the blockchain
which potentially creates a large database of historical inter-
actions of devices. This potentially exposes more data from
the users to the attacker over a longer period.
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ii) In conventional IoT classification methods the IP address
of the source and destination entities can be retrieved from
the packets which can be used as input to assist in identifying
the type of the devices, e.g., a device that frequently sends
packets to Nest servers may potentially be a smart thermostat.
In contrast, blockchain transactions contain the PK as the
identity of the involved entities and are broadcast to the
network. Blockchain participants can change their PK in each
transaction which in turn introduces a level of anonymity.
iii) In conventional methods for IoT device identification,
the identifier eavesdrops on real-time network traffic and thus
should have physical access to the network where the IoT
devices are deployed. The real-time traffic potentially contains
network packets as well as exchanged data and communica-
tions between parties. The pattern of network management
packets or the size of the packets can assist in identifying
the device. In contrast, in blockchain any entity can launch
device identification given that all participants can read the
blockchain independent of the physical location of the entities.
In blockchain, only the transaction corresponding to com-
munications between devices which contains the hash of the
exchanged data can be accessed. The network layer packets are
not stored in the blockchain, which in turn make it impossible
for the identifier to identify a device based on such data.
3) Contributions: In this paper, we study the possibility
of device identification in IoT-based blockchain by analyzing
the patterns of recorded transactions in the blockchain. As
an example, a Samsung camera that stores transactions in
blockchain can be identified as a “camera” by analyzing the
pattern of its transactions. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first attempt to identify device types in an IoT blockchain
context. In an IoT setting, each user owns a number of devices
that collect and share data with Service Providers (SP) and/or
other users to offer personalized services to the user. Exposure
of the user’s activity patterns results in serious privacy and
security concerns, e.g., the attacker can infer the hours that
a home is occupied by monitoring the temporal patterns of
transactions generated by motion sensors. In most blockchain
instantiations, the data of the IoT devices are not stored in the
blockchain, but rather off-the-chain in a separate cloud storage
with only the hash of the data being stored in the blockchain. It
is not necessary for the attacker to access the data to expose the
user’s activity as attackers can do so by monitoring the pattern
of stored communications, i.e., transactions, of IoT devices [9].
To study the device classification problem, we rely on
a smart home as a representative case study. We use the
smart home traffic dataset available in [10] and populate a
blockchain by generating transactions corresponding to device
communications. We study the success rate of classification
of the IoT devices, in terms of semantic type, based on
transaction patterns. To protect against this attack, we propose
multiple timestamp obfuscation methods, such as combining
multiple packets into a transactions, merging ledgers of mul-
tiple devices, and randomly delaying transactions, and study
the impact of the proposed methods on attack success.
The attacker’s aim is to match temporal signatures observed
in the transaction ledger to known inter-packet times of devices
in order to identify the type of devices. As the attack is a
pattern matching problem, we use machine learning, particu-
larly decision trees, to model the attacker. We choose decision
trees as our machine learning algorithm as the resulting
classifications are more explainable and they work well for
categorical data, which fits well for classifying different sensor
types. Our results show that attacks can correctly classify over
90% of devices in the ledger, while the timestamp obfuscation
methods can reduce attack success rates to between 20-30%.
4) Paper Structure: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section II discusses the related works. Details
of activity privacy in blockchain is outlined in Section III.
Evaluation results are presented in Section IV. Section V
presents discussions and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Blockchain users employ changeable PKs as their identity
to protect their transactions from being linked together, i.e.,
classified, that eventually may lead to user deanonymization.
Studies show user deanonymization is still possible using
blockchain and off-the-chain information [11], i.e., other pub-
licly available information in the Internet. While existing stud-
ies on blockchain transaction classification focus on Bitcoin,
their findings are equally relevant to other cryptocurrencies
that commonly record the sequence of coin exchange.
The authors in [12] argued that the analysis of the
blockchain transaction pattern involves three main steps:
1) Transaction graph: the flow of the transactions in the
blockchain can be represented as a graph. In this model, the
transactions serve as nodes and the PKs used as input/output of
the transactions serve as undirected edges between the nodes.
2) Address graph: this graph contains the flow of payments
between multiple PKs and is inferred by analyzing the trans-
action graph.
3) User graph: this graph contains the group of PKs that
might belong to the same user based on the information in
the address graph and heuristics available from Bitcoin. We
discuss examples of Bitcoin heuristics below.
The authors in [13] considered two heuristics to create the
user graph: multiple input transactions and shadow addresses.
With multiple input transactions, a Bitcoin transaction can
spend the output of multiple transactions using multi-input
transactions. The generator of the multi-input transaction must
have the private keys corresponding to the output PK of the
transactions to be spent. Thus, it is safe to assume that all these
transactions belong to the same user. With shadow addresses,
the Bitcoin user pays the remaining balance of his account to
a new PK, i.e., changes his PK, in each transaction to protect
his privacy. Accordingly, if the outputs of a transaction are
different from the inputs, one of the output addresses might
be the shadow address of the same user.
The authors in [11] cluster blockchain addresses based on
not only the blockchain transactions, but also the available off-
the-chain data, e.g., the instances where the PK is mentioned
along with a tag that can be a company name. The numer-
ical results show that the proposed method can successfully
classify the transactions with higher rate compared to methods
that are only based on the blockchain information.
Mixing services can be used to enhance user privacy [14].
A central node, known as mixer, changes the identity of the
user coin with a randomly chosen identity to break the link
between the users identities and thus protect their privacy.
However, classifying multiple transactions of a user is still
possible as proved by the authors in [15]. In [15] the authors
deanonymized users by exploiting the static and dynamic
parameters used by the mixing service to the mix keys.
The classification of transactions of the blockchain is largely
studied in Bitcoin. As blockchain is being widely applied to
non-monetary applications, e.g., IoT, it is critical to study
the anonymity of the blockchain in such systems. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first to analyze the
vulnerability of blockchain to classify device identification
in IoT. Device classification in blockchain-based IoT leads
to further privacy concerns as the classifier can identify the
transactions pattern which potentially can be linked to a user
and reveal the users activities. Thus, in the rest of the paper
we consider device classification for IoT as an attack against
user anonymity.
III. ACTIVITY PRIVACY OF BLOCKCHAIN IN IOT
In this section we discuss the implementation setting, attack
model, and different timestamp obfuscation methods to study
the device type identification risk in blockchain-based IoT.
A. Blockchain setup
We first describe the real-world smart home network traffic
data set used in our work, followed by a discussion about
the blockchain implementation. We use the smart home traffic
dataset available at [10] that is gathered from a real-world
deployment of smart home IoT devices. The dataset contains
the network traffic of 30 IoT devices for a period of two weeks.
Figure 1 depicts the network setup and types of IoT devices
in this dataset.
The blockchain is populated with transactions correspond-
ing to the communications of IoT devices in the dataset.
For each communication that a device makes with other
devices or nodes, e.g., Service Providers (SP), a transaction
is generated and stored in the blockchain. It is assumed that
devices change their PK for each transaction generated in
the network, which potentially achieves a level of anonymity.
To focus on the vulnerability of stored transactions to sensor
type classification, we intentionally abstract out the following
aspects of the network traffic and the blockchain: (a) the
network management traffic, e.g., SMTP, from the dataset,
as we assume that attackers only have access to the stored
ledger rather than real-time network traffic; (b) the consensus
algorithm, as the temporal patterns of the transactions are
independent of the consensus algorithm. The structure of each
transaction is as follows:
T ID||P.T ID||timestamp||Output||PK||Sign
Fig. 1. The IoT network testbed from [10].
Where TID is the unique identifier of the transaction
which is the hash of the transaction content. The transactions
belonging to the same node need to be chained together to
prevent Sybil attacks where a malicious node pretends to be
multiple nodes by generating fake transactions [16] (detailed
in the rest of this section). P.TID is the identity of the previous
transaction in the same ledger. timestamp is the time that each
transaction is generated and corresponds to the time that the
packets are generated in the database. Output is the hash of
the PK that the device will use in the next transaction. The
last two fields are the PK of the transaction generator and its
corresponding signature. If the communication corresponding
to the transaction involves data, the transaction generator
will sign the hash of the data and populate it in sign field.
Otherwise, the hash of the transaction is signed. Note that in
most existing blockchains, the data of IoT devices is not stored
in the blockchain due to packet and processing overheads.
Instead, only the hash of the data is stored which can still
ensure data integrity.
A single chain may be utilized by multiple devices to
enhance the anonymity of the user. In this case, it is difficult
for the malicious node to link the transactions in the ledger to
each device. The first transaction in a ledger is called genesis
transaction. The process of generating a genesis transaction
varies based on the specific instantiation of the blockchain.
However, all of these methods include a mechanism to limit
the number of genesis transactions a user can generate, e.g.,
burning coins in Bitcoin [16]. This essentially protects against
Sybil attacks.
In our implementation, a single node acts as miner and
collects all transactions generated by the devices. Once the
number of transactions reaches a pre-defined value, known
as blocksize, the miner forms a new block and appends it to
the blockchain. The transactions follow the same timestamps
as the communications in the dataset. Once the blockchain is
populated, we apply machine learning algorithms to identify
devices based on different attack models.
B. Attack Models
As shown in Table 1, the pattern of transactions mostly
represent a sequence of in-order numbers. Different patterns
share some features, e.g., a separation of 0.207s is found for
both the Smarts Things and the Nest smoke alarm. This pattern
can be best represented by trees, thus, the machine learning
algorithms, employed by the attacker, use decision trees to
analyze the pattern of transactions in the blockchain and
classify devices. The attacker can read the stored transactions
and blocks in the blockchain, but cannot decrypt the data
associated with the transactions without the corresponding
private key. The attacker first trains the machine learning
algorithm on a local network, referred to as testnet in the
rest of the paper. Depending on the testnet, the ability of the
attacker to detect the devices varies. We study the following
two attack models:
• Informed attack: In this attack, the attacker can determine
the number and exact type (manufacturer) of devices
used in a smart home, and aims to map its known
device list to specific PKs in order to infer the user’s
activities. We model an informed attacker by using a 10-
fold cross validation analysis, where the training process
always ensures that the entire range of sensor devices
in the home are represented in the trained algorithms.
As the attacker knows the type of devices in the smart
home, he can acquire similar devices and collect sufficient
network traffic data to populate a comprehensive training
set. While this attack is unlikely in practical scenarios,
as it requires the attackers to monitor the user’s sensor
acquisitions over a period of time prior to launching the
attack, we include it as a worst case scenario for activity
privacy risk analysis.
• Blind attack: In this attack, the attacker does not know the
number and type of devices installed in the smart home.
We model blind attackers by using training data that is
collected from a small scale IoT network containing a few
popular IoT devices. We then use test sets which contain
fewer or more types of devices than in the training set.
For instance, a motion sensor might be in the test set but
no in the training set. The blind attacker can recreate a
lab of his own with some typical smart home devices,
and train his machine learning algorithm with the data
from this lab. The training set may contain all, some, or
even none of the devices in the target smart home as the
attacker does not know the type and number of devices
installed in the target smart home.
C. Timestamp Obfuscation
In this section, we discuss different timestamp obfusca-
tion methods employed for increasing resilience to device
classification in blockchain. The attacker can classify the
transactions using their timestamp. Recall that only the hash of
the exchanged data is stored in the transactions. By looking at
Device Patterns of frequent time separation (in s)
Smart Things [0.207,58,0.207,58,]
Amazon Echo [0.217,30,0.004,30,]
TPLink Camera [0.12,61,0.12,61,]
Samsung Camera [0.165,30,0.165,30,]
Drop Camera 1.03 or 0.2
Insteon Camera2 [9x<0.0001,0.216,300,...]
Baby Monitor [600,0.28,600,0.28,]
TPLink Smartplug [0.24,236,0.24,236,]
TPLink Smartplug [0.12,236,0.12,236,]
iHome [60,0.205,60,0.205]
Nest Smockalarm [0.207,0.015,0.207,0.015,]
Netatmo Weather [1.72,0.33,1.72,0.33,]
Sleep Sensor [10,0.276,10,0.276,]
Lifx Smartbulb 1.92 or 60
Triby Speaker [1200.3-1200.3-560.3,]
Pix Photoframe [0.31 or >=0.3,65,650]
HP Printer 90
TABLE I
INTER-PACKET TEMPORAL PATTERNS FOR DEVICES
the timestamp of the transactions for each device, the attacker
can easily identify patterns for more than half the devices of
our sample (see Table III-C). These patterns make it possible
to classify observed transactions and identify which device
generated them.
We define three timestamp obfuscation methods that delay
transaction generation, combine packets into a single trans-
action, or combine transactions from multiple devices into
a single ledger, and compare them with a baseline approach
that does not employ timestamp obfuscation. In the baseline
approach, a transaction is generated for each single packet in
the dataset of a device. Our first obfuscation method introduces
a random delay for each transaction. More specifically, the
transaction corresponding to communication ‘c’ is generated
within the period of [tc, tc+ MaxDelay ], where tc is the time
that a communication occurs, and MaxDelay is the maximum
possible delay defined by the user. This method changes the
pattern of transactions stored in the blockchain and increases
the complexity of classifying transactions. The random delay
is generated independently for each transaction, so the trans-
action ordering may also change.
In the baseline implementation all transactions of the same
source (i.e., of a same device) are assigned to the same ledger.
The distribution of the devices amongst the ledgers has a
significant impact on the overall privacy as it links different
transactions together. If all transactions of the same device
are chained together, changing the PK per transaction will not
affect the anonymity of the user as clearly all transactions
in a ledger belong to the same user (no matter how the PK
changes). Thus, in the second proposed obfuscation method,
called multi-node ledgers, a single ledger is shared for storing
transactions among multiple devices. This potentially protects
against the attacker that evaluates the transactions of a ledger
to infer the pattern of transactions and thus contributes to
safeguarding device types.
IoT devices sometimes send data in bulk, for instance,
when reporting highly relevant events. Large data payloads
are fragmented into multiple packets that are transmitted
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. The impact of delayed transactions for informed attacks (a) and blind attacks (b)
within a short timeframe. An attacker can exploit payload
fragmentation by observing the stream of packets to infer the
device type. Therefore, our third measure for data obfuscation
creates multi-packet transactions, where we combine multiple
packets from the same sender into one transaction. This can
also be considered as summarizing all the communications in a
single transaction. This timestamp obfuscation method reduces
the likelihood of device type classification as: i) the volume
of available data for the attacker decreases, ii) the pattern of
transactions will not match with pattern of communications
by the device which increases the difficulty of classifying the
transactions.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our three timestamp obfuscation
methods through experiments on the empirical smart home
dataset. We evaluate these methods for both informed and
blind attack. For each measure, we synthetically create transac-
tions based on the packet traces and then evaluate an attacker’s
ability to correctly classify the devices in the trace. We first
evaluate these measures individually, then combine them to
understand their cumulative benefits.
A. Delayed transactions
Considering the observed characteristic separation times
observed in the devices’ patterns (Table III-C), we introduce
random delays generated in intervals of [0, 0.5], [0, 2]
and [0, 30] seconds respectively. The time separating two
successive transactions of the same device is less regular, and
the previously identified patterns are at least partly disturbed.
Figure 2 shows the results for delayed transactions, for both
informed and blind attacks. Applying any of these random
delays decreases the accuracy of the classification by more
than 15% for the informed attacker model. There is only a
small difference between the results obtained for experiments
with the [0, 0.5] and [0, 2] intervals. This can be explained by
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Fig. 3. The impact of multi-node ledgers in informed and blind attack models.
the fact that examining the devices’ patterns, the recognisable
times are either < 0.4 seconds or ≥ 28 seconds. Testing two
different delays in this interval has close results, as it wouldn’t
disturb the patterns. A delay of about 30 seconds creates a
significant step of 30 seconds of separation, and makes it
harder to identify patterns and to classify the transactions.
For blind attacks, the classification accuracy drops for all
approaches. However, there is still a reduction of over 10%
with delayed transactions relative to the baseline approach.
B. Multi-device ledgers
To see the impact of the number of devices per ledger, we
randomly assign devices to a common ledger and classify their
combined transactions, while varying the number of devices
per ledger. Figure 3 shows the results. In the informed attack
model, multi-node ledgers significantly reduce attack success
rates from nearly 98% for single node ledgers to around 50%
for ledgers with 17 nodes. When a small number of devices
are pooled together, it is easier to differentiate the transactions’
origins when we already know their behaviour, as they each
have their own distinct temporal patterns. In contrast, including
transactions from a larger number of devices in a ledger
convolves inter-transaction times across devices, which is
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. The impact of multi-packet transactions for informed attacks (a) and blind attacks (b)
further accentuated when two devices have similar transaction
temporal patterns. It also becomes harder to infer patterns
based on the separation times, as two back-to-back transactions
are less likely to originate from the same device if we increase
the number of devices included (and therefore the total number
of transactions).
The overall success rates for blind attacks is considerably
lower, and interestingly, the general trend for average attack
success rate slightly increases with more devices per ledger.
In this attack model, we train our algorithm to recognize an
available subset of all possible devices, hoping that at least
devices present in the home (the test) are in our training set.
The test set can therefore vary significantly from our training
set. A large number of devices within the same ledger will
make the test set more similar to the training set, so the
classification accuracy increases on a large sample. For smaller
numbers of devices inside a ledger, we observe a high variance
in the results. In fact, the trend in reduced variance with an
increase in the number of devices per ledger is evident. Given
this high variance across trials, we examine the maximum
possible attack success in the model. Increasing the number of
devices per ledger from 1 to 17 reduces the maximum attack
success rate from around 85% to 30% for blind attacks.
C. Multi-packet transactions
The maximum separation time for two consecutive packets
from the same device varies across devices depending on
their function. Combining multiple packets into a transaction
conceals short separation times which allowed us to build
recognition models for individual devices. Additionally, it
allows to encompass the whole peak of data, when there
is one. The exact number of packets that are combined
together depends on application and the total number of
packets generated by the device. Figure 4 shows the results
for informed and blind attacks. For informed attackers, multi-
packet transactions decrease the classification accuracy by
about 20% on average. The attacker has clear understanding
of the patterns of transactions and thus uses short separation
times to discriminate a device from another. By consolidating
multiple packets to a single transaction and thus removing the
separation time, the rate of correct identification is reduced.
The change is less obvious for blind attackers, but the results
obtained after this operation are still lower than the ones we
get with the baseline method. Recall that a blind attacker only
uses a subset of actual devices in its training set, so it has lower
visibility to distinguish the devices, basing it only on higher
separation times. Concealing the shortest separation times with
multi-packet transactions has a greater impact on an informed
attacker than on a blind attacker given the informed attacker’s
full visibility into the device type and their short separation
times. There is significant variation in the differences between
single and multi-packet transactions over different days in
the simulation for blind attacks, as the performance depends
significantly on the active devices on that day and whether
these devices are in the blind attacker’s training set.
D. Combined Timestamp Obfuscation
We have seen that all the timestamp obfuscation methods,
applied separately, increase resilience against device
identification compared to the baseline case. Noting that
the percentage of correctly classified transactions should be
around 5% for a strategy that randomly picks a device from
the set ( knowing that our experimental set is made of about
20 devices) we now evaluate the effects of combining our
obfuscation measures.
We first combine multi-packet transactions with multi-node
ledgers, and report the results in Figure 5. For informed
attackers though, the combination of multi-packet transactions
with multi-node ledgers does improve the privacy by about
10% all along, as the additional concealment of fine-grained
temporal features reduces the value of the informed attacker’s
full visibility into device types. Combining multi-packet
transactions with multi-node ledgers yields results extremely
close ( less than 5% of difference) to the ones obtained with
single-packet transactions, for blind attackers. Again, the
reason is that blind attackers rely more on longer packet
separation time and are less impacted by obfuscations
affecting short separation times.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. The combined impact of multi-packet transactions and multi-node ledgers for informed attacks (a) and blind attacks (b)
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. The combined impact of multi-packet transactions and delayed for informed attacks (a) and blind attacks (b)
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. The combined impact of all three methods for informed attacks (a) and blind attacks (b)
Next, we combine delayed transactions with multi-packet
transactions, and the results are shown in Figure 6. Delaying
transactions alongside multi-packet transactions yields similar
results as before: delaying transactions by up to 0.5 or 2
seconds gives similar results, and delaying transactions by
up to 30 seconds significantly improves the privacy, reducing
the classification accuracy by 10% or more. However, if we
compare these results to the ones obtained when using single-
packet transactions, we surprisingly notice that the privacy is
actually better with delayed single-packet transactions. One
reason could be that, in our raw sample, the distribution
of the transactions within the different devices is relatively
balanced (with roughly comparable numbers of transactions
per device). Multi-packet transactions can cause significant
changes in the transaction distribution across devices, with
some devices becoming more dominant and others becoming
scarcely represented. This results in classifiers achieving high
performance by simply guessing the more dominant devices
all the time.
Finally, we compare the impact of combining all three
timestamp obfuscation measures, shown in Figure 7. For
informed attackers, multi-packet transactions with no delay
perform best for ledgers with 1-2 devices. The likely rea-
son is that the delay has diminishing returns on timestamp
obfuscation when both multi-packet transactions and multi-
node ledgers are in place. We note though that results for 1-2
devices are more sensitive to the simulation’s random selection
of devices for each run, which brings in dependencies of the
selected device(s)’ temporal features. The combined approach
of all three measures and a delay of 30 seconds performs best
overall, achieving the lowest classification accuracy of 24%.
For blind attacks, there is a slight advantage for the combined
approach with 2 second delays for ledgers of 1-2 nodes, while
again overall the combined approach with a 30 second delay
achieves the attack success rate at 19%.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed device classification in IoT-based
blockchain which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
to provide such analysis. We show that device identification
in blockchain-based IoT introduces privacy concerns. Unlike
conventional IoT device classification methods where the
identifier requires to have physical access to the network, in
blockchain-based IoT any entity can identify devices inde-
pendent of the location of the entity. We used a smart home
setting as a representative case study of the IoT. We applied
machine learning algorithms on the blockchain to classify the
devices. The results have demonstrated that the attacks can
have up to 90% accuracy in classifying type and number
of devices in a smart home. To reduce the success rate of
device classification, we proposed three timestamp obfuscation
methods such as combining multiple packets into a single
transaction, merging ledgers of multiple packets, and randomly
delaying transactions. The proposed timestamp obfuscation
methods can reduce the success rate to below 30%.
By monitoring the frequency of the transactions generated
by IoT devices, e.g., motion sensors or smart lock, the attacker
can identify the hours that the smart home is occupied or is
empty which may lead to further security risks, e.g., robbery.
Additionally, the attacker can compromise the privacy of
the user as it can monitor the communications of the IoT
devices, stored as transactions in the blockchain, that reveal
information about the user activities. As future work, we plan
to study device identification and user deanonymization in
other applications which includes energy trading and smart
cities. Additionally, we plan to study the impact of the training
set on the informed attack.
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